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A Review of Values in Translation: Human
Rights and the Culture of the World Bank by
Galit A. Sarfaty
AMANDA CRAIG*
In Values in Translation, Galit Sarfaty depicts an unfortunate but
ostensible truth about the World Bank, in which the economics
discipline reigns supreme: frame your issue in economic terms, and the
World Bank may act on it; but frame your issue in economic terms, and
you may forfeit your issue's essential core. As such, wide adoption of a
human rights policy at the World Bank may require human rights to be
analyzed and implemented empirically, devoid of their complicated
political and legal contexts, which may ultimately undercut the
protection of those rights. Moreover, in leaving unresolved her catch-22,
Sarfaty demonstrates the complexity of global governance-due not only
to competing values within the system but also to bureaucratic
dynamics embedded in ambitious international institutions.
Such bureaucratic dynamics include organizational culture and
ineffective translation of knowledge among disciplines, which have
stifled the World Bank's development and adoption of certain policies,
including human rights. Detailing and explaining these dynamics is a
central goal of Sarfaty's book. In recent decades, she explains, many
other international organizations, private financial institutions, and aid
agencies have adopted human rights agendas, but amidst such
increased consciousness, the Bank is an anomaly. Despite both external
and internal pressure to do so, the Bank does not consider the impact of
its lending on human rights, require client countries to comply with
international treaty obligations, or suspend projects when client
countries abuse human rights.' In short, Sarfaty, an anthropologist and
legal scholar, unpacks why the Bank has not done so in Values in
Translation.
* J.D. 2014, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; M.Sc. in Refugee and Forced
Migration Studies, University of Oxford; B.S. in Journalism, Northwestern University.
1. GALIT A. SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF
THE WORLD BANK (2012), at 23-50.
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She first highlights efforts both outside and within the Bank to push
it to adopt a human rights policy or implement a human rights impact
assessment for its own projects. After noting that nongovernmental
organizations have pressured corporations to develop such policies and
the Bank to develop other social and environmental policies, she
explains that there is actually "a lack of consensus among advocates
over whether to pressure the Bank to adopt a human rights agenda ...
."2 Advocates fear that the Bank may "co-opt" human rights (as it has
environmental issues) or pass an "inadequate human rights policy,"
which would then be very difficult to substantially revise. 3 In addition,
the Bank's internal efforts-including an interdisciplinary human
rights-focused working group in the 1990s and a human rights report,
workshop, and institution-wide task force in the 2000s-could not gain
sufficient traction.4 According to Sarfaty, both institutional and
normative challenges explain failed internal campaigns. Because task
force members did not receive from the Bank's president or board a
clear mandate to move forward, they acted cautiously and "made only
symbolic gestures rather than concrete steps toward change."5 In
addition, it was difficult for employees from different sectors and
disciplinary backgrounds to reach consensus, and the Legal Department
and regional departments fought to control the human rights agenda.6
But Sarfaty argues that the more significant, underlying problem-
which has allowed these institutional challenges to completely stymie
progress-is "ambivalence over the conflicting relationship between
human rights and the prevailing neoliberal ideology within the Bank."7
Neoliberal capitalism, to which the Bank adheres, opposes or embraces
human rights depending on circumstance; for instance, its core belief in
individual freedom is consistent with property rights but not with
distributive justice. Reflecting these contradictions, the Bank draws
arbitrary lines around certain rights. Those that are consistent with its
ideology are considered implementable by the Bank, and those that are
inconsistent with its ideology are referred to as "political"-an attribute
signifying that implementation is beyond the Bank's mandate.8 For
instance, the Bank considers forced labor and employment
discrimination against women but does not take into account freedom of
2. Id. at 35.
3. Id. at 33-35.
4. Id. at 36-42.
5. Id. at 43.
6. Id. at 44-46.
7. Id. at 42-43.
8. Id. at 4; 52-60.
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association or the right to collective bargaining, referring to the former
as apolitical and the latter as political.9
After identifying the Bank's ambivalence as the ultimate cause of its
failure to develop and implement a human rights agenda, Sarfaty delves
into a deeper analysis of the institutional restraints that confound
efforts to overcome such ambivalence. She cites political constraints,
including, most importantly, the influence of large borrower countries,
like China, that oppose adopting a human rights agenda and deeply
divide the Bank's governing board.10 In addition, she explains that the
Bank's Articles of Agreement require that the Bank ignore politics when
lending money." However, she also demonstrates that "the deeply
divided board is not as critical an obstacle to human rights adoption as
it may seem," and other issues, like corruption, have been depoliticized
and then adopted by the Bank.12 In fact, the Bank itself has claimed the
right to decide whether an issue is political; for instance, former Bank
President James Wolfensohn declared that
corruption is . . . not political but it is social and
economic and, therefore, I am allowed to talk about it.
And if .. . politicians think that it is political, that is not
my problem. I think it is social and economic. Therefore,
I can talk about it.13
Moreover, two general counsels at the Bank authored opinions
acknowledging the "centrality of human rights within development" and
the importance of interpreting the Articles flexibly over time.14
Most scholarship focuses exclusively on the legal and political
obstacles that the Bank faces in attempting to adopt a human rights
policy, but Sarfaty demonstrates that the impact of such obstacles is
limited and then considers alternative institutional obstacles.
Specifically, she analyzes the significant impact of organizational
9. Id. at 47.
10. Id. at 51-56.
11. More specifically, the Articles of Agreement state that "[t]he Bank and its officers
shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in
their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only
economic considerations shall be relevant . . . ." In addition, they state that "[t]he Bank
shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the
purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations of economy
and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-economic influences or
considerations." Id. at 58.
12. Id. at 56, 59-60.
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 59, 63.
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culture on the development of a human rights agenda. With unusual
access to the Bank's programs and staff, she contemplates how
programs are researched, designed, implemented, and incentivized. For
one, she notes that Bank employees are not trained on how to choose
among competing priorities if, for instance, a project is benefitting
people whose government is nonetheless unfairly locking up
dissidents.15
She also describes how the Bank's incentive system discourages
employees from creating projects that consider human rights issues.
The Bank favors financially expansive and quickly approved projects, in
part because getting money out the door is easier to measure than a
project's actual "contribution to results." 6 This bias is exacerbated by
the structure of assignments in the Bank; employees generally move
from unit to unit "every three to seven years," making long-term
assessment of projects difficult and the tying of promotions to long-term
outcomes nearly impossible.17 In addition, employees have learned to
"refrain from carrying out projects that will trigger safeguard policies"-
like environmental or indigenous peoples policies-since they may
"delay the progress of a loan and increase its expense."' 8
Sarfaty then emphasizes yet another organizational culture issue:
the ways in which knowledge is created and translated by professionals
representing various academic disciplines. While acknowledging that a
range of perspectives and goals among unique individuals means that
disciplines and their frames of reference are dynamic and may often
overlap, she argues that the economic discipline uses particularly
distinct language. Especially within the World Bank, the persistence of
this distinct language is likely the result of economists' position relative
to that of individuals from other disciplines. She writes that economists
represent the "dominant subculture" of the Bank-that economists'
"expertise ranks as the most valuable," and their "language is the
dominant mode of communication and rationality."19
The Bank has seemingly attempted to compensate for this
unevenness by adopting a "matrix" organizational structure in which
employees in different geographic and functional units cross-report; for
instance, an employee in operations may be responsible to bosses in a
country-management unit, a thematic research unit (e.g., poverty, the
environment), and a sector-management unit (at headquarters). 20 The
15. Id. at 77-78.
16. Id. at 79.
17. Id. at 80.
18. Id. at 87.
19. Id. at 96.
20. Id. at 89-90.
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matrix system is intended to "balance potentially conflicting objectives,"
including those among disciplines. 21 However, employees find the
system "difficult and confusing," and management scholars have argued
that it has produced turf battles among units and loss of
accountability. 22
In any case, economists continue to dominate, and anthropologists,
sociologists, and lawyers "struggle to reconcile their norms, priorities,
and methodologies" with those of economists. 23 In 2005, the Bank's
Social Development Department organized a day-long training on its
own irrelevance. Sarfaty recognized that the Department's "biggest
challenge was semantic: they had to bridge the communication gap with
economists by measuring results and using indicators."24 However, she
did not discover a similar training session that would encourage
economists to learn to speak the language of noneconomists.
Rather, economists seek from other disciplines empirical work that
demonstrates "causal links between human rights and economic
growth."25 Yet, Sarfaty explains that framing human rights in ways that
resonate with economists may have detrimental effects. For instance,
economists may prefer projects that are designed through an
"instrumental" framework, which considers "human rights as a means
to an end," rather than an "intrinsic" framework, which considers
"human rights as an end in itself."26 Comparing HIV/AIDS projects that
adopted intrinsic and instrumental frames, she demonstrates that the
former project resulted in much wider human rights protection than the
latter.27
Instead of adopting an instrumental frame, Sarfaty recommends
that the Bank continue to pursue its most recent "incremental, under-
the-radar strategy" in which lawyers focus on pilot human rights
projects in willing environments rather than advocating for an
operational policy that would be incorporated into existing programs
and require explicit management support.28 She finds such an
incremental approach preferable to human rights losing its "essential
core" through depoliticization and delegalization (though she
acknowledges that human rights are already entering the Bank
"through an instrumental framework"). 29 To demonstrate these
21. Id. at 90.
22. Id. at 90-91.
23. Id. at 94.
24. Id. at 95.
25. Id. at 126-27.
26. Id. at 117-18.
27. Id. at 120-23.
28. Id. at 129.
29. Id. at 15, 132, 137.
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potential negative effects, she analyzes the Bank's efforts to mainstream
anticorruption, which required its depoliticization and "translation into
an economic logic," resulting in an implementation "that is flawed at
best and destructive to the Bank's mission at worst."30 As such, Sarfaty
concludes that depoliticizing human rights "may be a necessary first
step" before the issue can be mainstreamed in "an economic institution
like the Bank," but she contends that it will have to be repoliticized
"before real organizational change can occur."3 1
She also asks why the economist subculture is so dominant within
the Bank and discovers a "broader institutionalization of economics"
that poses a deeper challenge to the implementation of human rights.32
She explains that economists' numbers "serve as a technology of
distance," and their authority is derived from their capacity to overcome
that distance and the physical or social barriers that it implies. 33
Numbers have achieved "prestige and power" in our modern world
because, "in the context of intense disagreement, suspicion, and
skepticism," they enable state bureaucrats "to achieve uniformity and
public trust, and to dispel the notion that their decisions were arbitrary
and biased since they lacked the mandate of a popular election."34 In
addition, the global circulation of capital, globalization of economics,
and globalization of the law have created "opportunities for economists
to enter legal arenas worldwide."35 Moreover, the Bank itself "has
facilitated the global expansion of capital and the diffusion of economic
paradigms, not only within borrower countries but also within the
bureaucracy itself."36 Considering the dominance of economic
paradigms, then, repoliticizing an issue like human rights will likely be
very difficult unless the "clash of normative rationalities" that exists
between economics and human rights-which Sarfaty also frames as a
clash between the market and social democratic liberalism-is more
effectively bridged both within and beyond the Bank.37
30. Id. at 135, 136.
31. Id. at 137.
32. Id. at 98.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 99-100.
35. Id. at 100.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 8.
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